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The Use and Abuse of the
Rules of Civil Procedure
By WATSON CLAY*
Lord Coke once observed:
The court is aptly resembled to a clock which hath within
it many wheels and many motions; all as well the lesser
as the greater must move; but after their proper man-
ner, place and -motion; if the motion of the lesser be
hindered, it will hinder the motion of the greater.
Perhaps there is nothing more important to the movement of
the machinery of justice than the procedural rules by which litiga-
tion is conducted. The rods and pinions of court action are de-
pendent upon them. In turn, the very rights of clients are in large
measure dependent upon the lawyer's thorough knowledge of
their existence and application. It is a sad reflection upon our
profession when we consider that the loss of a lawsuit may some-
times be attributed in a substantial degree to the failure of the
lawyer to know, understand, and comply with rules of procedure.
The lawyer is presumed to be an expert in the field of law.
A comprehensive understanding of legal procedure is as essential
to him as the compass is to the sea captain. A mariner could not
leave the shore without a practical working knowledge of the rules
of navigation. How possibly may the lawyer assume to initiate a
proceeding in court and guide it through to a successful con-
clusion without a sure grasp of the rules of the road? After all, a
fixed procedural method is absolutely essential to the administra-
tion of justice by our courts.
This does not mean that an attorney must know the rules by
heart or that he can even quote verbatim a single rule in the
book. But the fact remains that the rule book is always available
on his desk, and it is such an astoundingly simple matter for him
* Commissioner, Kentucky Court of Appeals, author of Clay, Kentucky Civil
Rules (1954).
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to examine and re-examine any part thereof that pertains to pro-
posed legal action on his part. When the lawyer is confronted
with a problem involving some legal principle, he invariably goes
to the Digest, the case book, or other authorities to find the an-
swer. Why does he not go to the rule book to find the clear-cut
and simple answers to his procedural problems?
Perhaps the reason is that some lawyers do not comprehend
that they are constantly confronted with procedural problems.
They sometimes seem to assume that once in court, the settled
processes of law and a sympathetic judge will take care of their
cases for them. This is an unwarranted assumption and is a
reflection upon the very competence of the attorney. Every mem-
ber of our profession holds himself out to the public as being an
expert in legal matters. On that basis he may charge for his
services. Any lawyer practicing in our courts who does not main-
tain a sound working knowledge of the machinery of justice does
not properly belong in our profession.
While every attorney cannot be absolutely top flight, due to
limitations of ability, each member of our profession can be and
should be an expert on procedure. It requires little more than the
ability to read, and not much reading at that. While we may
understand "Why Johnny can't read", it is incomprehensible that
a lawyer should lack this capability.
If we could be convinced that procedural rules are essential
and important, perhaps we might be persuaded to read and reread
those few which are pertinent to the particular course of pro-
ceeding affecting our cases at any given point.
The Philosophy of Procedural Rules
Perhaps there is no more piteous cry in the field of law than
the lament "My opponent is relying upon a mere technicality".
This means that my opponent has raised (to my embarrassment)
an objection to the flagrant violation of a procedural rule. The
expression "mere technicality" suggests that there is some special
form of technicality which should be ignored by the court under
particular circumstances. It further suggests that a non-mere tech-
nicality should have binding force and effect. As we go up and
down the scale we find certain so-called "technicalities" are more
non-mere than others. This brings us to an unnecessary and
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profitless problem: When must a lawyer comply with procedural
rules and when may he ignore them with impunity? The answer
is not found in branding a rule some species of technicality. As
the Court of Appeals recently said, "all rules of legal procedure
are technical. They are peculiar to the science and practice of
law. They prescribe the specialized method by which the judicial
process may be invoked and exercised."'
It is true that under the common law and the codes there
were a number of confusing and perhaps unnecessary technical
procedural requirements. As was once said about the English
Constitution, scrutinizing the ancient procedural rules was "like
looking at the nests of birds or the curious and intricate work of
beavers and insects." In the course of the development of law,
particularly in recent years, we have recognized that many formal
requirements of procedure were unnecessary and unfair.
In the light of this experience, our Kentucky Rules of Civil
Procedure, like the Federal Rules, were adopted for the very pur-
pose of doing away with unnecessary formal requirements at one
time indigenous to the common law or the Civil Code which
could be classified as "mere technicalties". By a very labored
process some of the best legal minds in America over a long
period of years have attempted to winnow out those rules or re-
quirements which might properly fall in that class. The result is
that what we have in our Rules of Civil Procedure is a complete
set of non-mere technicalities. If a procedural requirement was
not thought absolutely necessary to the proper administration of
justice, it would not be in the Rules.
If non-observance of any rule by a few may be justified, then
all lawyers in fairness should be excused from compliance, and
such a "mere" rule would disappear in a limbo of disuse. Applying
this same philosophy to each rule would destroy the procedural
scheme entirely, and it would be impossible for courts to operate.
It has been said that:
Judicial procedure fixes the conditions, the time and man-
ner as to which one may seek the use of the courts; it
prevents surprise, oppression, and a subsequent attack on
the same issue; it makes the humblest man the equal of
the strongest, and it confines the oppressive hand of the




government to the orderly method open as well to the
humblest citizen. ... Since justice can only be administered
scientifically, not popularly, it must be done by fixed cor-
related rules,...
2
It is true that under certain circumstances the violation of a
procedural rule may be excused or may be waived by the opposing
party. In addition, Rule 61 gives the courts a substantial latitude
in relieving a party from the dire consequences of an act or omis-
sion contrary to the rules, where the requirement of strict com-
pliance would result in manifest injustice. However, it is an unbe-
coming plea that any procedural rule is a "technicality" which
should not be enforced. As we have said before, such rules are
techiiical. But the lawyer is supposed to be a technician, and it is
his job to have knowledge of such rules as affect his particular
proceeding, and to comply therewith.
With the foregoing in mind let us examine a few of the pro-
cedural problems that have developed in our five years of opera-
tion under the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
Stating a Claim-Do We Still Have a Cause of Action?
One of the most confusing requirements under the New York
and Kentucky Civil Codes was the requirement that a plaintiff in
his petition must "state facts which constitute a cause of action".
This led to endless feather-edge distinctions between evidentiary
facts, ultimate facts, and legal conclusionsY It led to truly tech-
nical and formal requirements in the statement of a cause of
action. With the adoption of the Kentucky Civil Rules, the re-
quirements of pleading make no reference to either "facts" or
"cause of action". Under Rule 8.01 a person asserting a right of
recovery against another is required only to set forth "a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief". Nothing could be more non-technical.
Just because a rule is couched in non-technical terms, how-
ever, does not authorize distortion of its meaning to a point where
it loses its true significance. Unfortunately, under the original
Federal Rule employing the same terms, and unfortunately under
this Kentucky Rule, some have taken the view that it abolished
2 Sheldon, "The Philosophy of Rules of Court," 13 A.B.A.J. No. 3, pt. 2, 3-4
(1927).
3 See Clay, Kentucky Civil Rules 91-92 (1954).
[Vol. 47,
RuLEs OF CivL PROcEDuBE
the necessity of good pleading. Because the words "cause of
action" had been deleted, it was on occasion assumed that the
pleading need only give notice of the existence of a claim, and
not its nature or the legal theory upon which it was based. This
unfair and improper result led to a movement under the Federal
Rules to reinstate the words "facts" and "cause of action" in the
rule.' The opponents of this proposal vigorously assailed the at-
tempt to go back to the formalities of Code pleading. -
Those who opposed reincarnation of the Code phraseology
offered a counter-amendment to the Rule which would make it
quite clear that it still required the statement of an essential cause
of action. The proposed clarifying language to be added to Fed-
eral Rule 8(a) (2) (the same as our Rule 8.01(2) was this:
A statement of a claim shall not be deemed sufficient
to show that the pleader is entitled to relief unless its
allegations of fact, if established, would support a judgment
in favor of the pleader. Mere assertion of a claim or of a
bare legal conclusion shall not be sufficient.
This constitutes simply a statement of the proper construction
of the Rule, which the writer believes was the construction in-
tended by those who originally drafted it. Such is apparent from
the 1955 report of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. We may paraphrase a part of that report:
The intent and effect of the Rule is to permit a claim to be stated
in general terms and it is designed to discourage battles over
mere form of statement. The Rule adequately sets forth the
characteristics of good pleading and requires a disclosure of
adequate information by the pleader as the basis of his claim for
relief, as distinguished from a bare averment that he wants relief
and is entitled to it.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals has from the outset so con-
strued the Rule as requiring a fair statement of the nature of the
plaintiff's claim. In Johnson v. Coleman5 it was pointed out that
the simplification and liberality in the Rules was "not so great as
to obliterate the necessity of stating the elements of a cause of
action or defense.... ." In Pryor v. York's Executor,6 it was said:
4 For an interesting discussion of this suggested change, see "Claim or Cause
of Action," 13 F.R.D. 253 (1953).
5 288 S.W. 2d 348, 849 (Ky. 1956).
6 805 S.W. 2d 775, 777 (Ky. 1957). For a comment on this case see 47 Ky.
L.J. 141 (1958).
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The plaintiff's pleadings in this case disclose a set of cir-
cumstances which may possibly have given rise to an
implied contract authorizing a recovery upon quantum
meruit. However, to meet the requirements of the rule
regarding notice to the adversary, a pleading must do more
than merely expose a right of recovery or a right to rely
upon a certain defense. The pleadings must show clearly
that action is being taken on that right of recovery, or that
the right to a defense is being asserted as such.
Though the language appears in a dissenting opinion and the
case involved a different pleading rule, the writer believes that the
classic statement of Judge Sims in Lee v. StamperF represents a
fair view of the pleading requirements of Rule 8.01. That state-
ment was:
True, the Rules of Civil Procedure attempt to get away
from the strict requirements of the Civil Code, but to my
mind this does not mean the Civil Rules have eliminated
all requirements of pleading a cause of action, or that a
monkey may now prepare a complaint as well as a man.
It is an abuse of this Rule to rely upon its simple requirements
as an excuse by the lawyer for failure to prepare his case prior to
invoking the services of a court. As a matter of fact, the Rule
forces the lawyer, and properly so, to determine the essential
ultimate facts and the legal theory upon which his claim is based.
As said by Judge Yankwich:8
When a case comes into a lawyer's office, as every prac-
ticing lawyer knows, what you get from your client is an
undigested mass of facts. A lot of it is pertinent and a lot is
not pertinent. The lawyer's first and big job is to analyze
and break down that mass of facts and find out what is
pertinent and relevant, relevant to whatever principles may
control that case. He has to start that job of defining and
refining the issues before he himself can ever come to a con-
clusion as to what the case involves, or whether his client
has any rights or he can present it to the court.
It may then be said that Rule 8.01 is of real use to the lawyer
in guiding him into an analysis of his case and the legal basis of
his claim before he commences his lawsuit. To the younger lawyer
especially may this observation prove of value: A great many
7 300 S.W. 2d 251, 255 (Ky. 1957).
8 "Claim or Cause of Action" 13 F.R.D. 253, 269 (1953).
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difficulties caused our circuit judges and our Court of Appeals,
and many unfortunate results, stem from the fact that the lawyer
does not fully comprehend the legal aspects of his case, even when
he goes into trial. Proper compliance with Rule 8.01 requires him
to understand, and to present in writing, the factual and legal
essence of his claim.
Summary Judgment
Perhaps no procedural device in our Rules of Civil Procedure
has contributed more to the expedition of cases than Rule 56,
providing for summary judgment. This Rule has had widespread
use and has sometimes come in for abuse.
Soon after adoption of the Rules, the possibilities of the Rule
were recognized by lawyers and judges. Enthusiasm in invoking
the Rule sometimes led lawyers to move for summary judgment in
cases where such relief was clearly not justified.
A summary judgment, which is a final adjudication, is author-
ized only if the case presents no genuine issue of a material fact
and the moving party has shown himself entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. On the motion matters outside the record, such
as affidavits, may be considered. Because of the simplicity of the
procedure, it often seemed like a good idea to try the case on this
motion, thereby avoiding the delay and difficulty of a jury trial.
The popularity of the motion sometimes caused lawyers, and even
a circuit judge or two, to overlook the fact that summary judg-
ment procedure is not a substitute for the trial of an action on its
merits. It is an abuse of the Rule to invoke it to short-circuit a
trial if there are issues of material fact in controversy.
Summary judgment procedure does not authorize a trial court
to adjudicate any issues of fact. In Rowland v. Miller's Admr.,9
the opinion states:
The courts have repeatedly admonished that the rule should
be cautiously invoked; that it does not authorize the adju-
cation of factual issues but only authorizes the court by a
pretrial sifting to penetrate the allegations of fact and to
look to an evidential source or material extraneous to the
pleadings solely to discover and determine whether there
is an issue of fact to be tried.
9 307 S.W. 2d 3, 6 (Ky. 1956).
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The question is not who should win on a trial, but whether
there is any reason for a trial.
The motion for summary judgment has been successfully in-
voked in two automobile negligence cases.' 0 However, because
the facts which constitute negligence are so varied, and differing
inferences may be drawn from those facts, this procedure is not
well suited to negligence actions."'
On the other hand, this procedural device should be utilized
fully when the only real issue in the case is one of law rather than
fact.' 2
It may be observed that the formal allegations of a pleading
are not sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment if
they are attacked by affidavits or other proof presented by the
moving party. As was said in Gevedon v. Grigsby,3 a prime pur-
pose of summary judgment procedure is to "pierce the pleadings".
Consequently, the defending party on such a motion should make
sure that he shows, perhaps by counter-affidavit, that a material
fact does exist.' 4 However, a cautionary word seems appropriate
here. The hearing on the motion is not a trial of the issues of fact.
The court cannot decide those issues on affidavits. Therefore, it is
not necessary or appropriate for either party to present in any
detail the actual evidence that would be produced at a trial.
Matters outside the record which may be considered on this mo-
tion must be directed to the question of whether or not an issue
of material fact exists and not to the question of which party
would be successful on that issue.
May the trial court grant a summary judgment to the party
opposing a motion for summary judgment even though such party
has not made such a motion? The Court of Appeals has decided
that such a procedure is proper.' 5 However, the trial judge must
be very careful that in granting a summary judgment to a party
who has not made a motion to that effect he does not put such
party in a prejudicial position. It is possible that the party oppos-
' 10 Bell v. Harmon, 284 S.W. 2d 812 (Ky. 1955); Payne v. B-Line Cab Co.,
282 S.W. 2d 842 (Ky. 1955).
11 Puckett v. Elsner, 803 S.W. 2d 250 (Ky. 1957).
12 See BRhorer v. Rhorer's Ex'r., 272 S.W. 2d 801 (Ky. 1954); Gumm v.
Combs, 802 S.W. 2d 616 (Ky. 1957); Gevedon v. Grigsby, 303 S.W. 2d 282 (Ky.
1957).
13 Gevedon v. Grigsby, 803 S.W. 2d 282, 284 (Ky. 1957).
'4 See Clay, Kentucky Civil Rules (Supp. 1957, at 72-73).
15 Collins v. Duff, 283 S.W. 2d 179 (Ky. 1955).
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ing a motion has not presented his best case for summary judg-
ment and he might be at a disadvantage on an appeal from the
summary judgment in his favor.
In the event both parties move for a summary judgment, does
this constitute an agreement to permit the trial court to decide
the case as a matter of law without a trial? This question has
been presented to the Court of Appeals and has been decided in
the negative.16 It must be remembered that the summary judg-
ment is proper only if there is no genuine issue as to a material
fact (and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law). If such genuine issue is developed, even though both
parties have moved for summary judgment, it is the duty of the
trial court to assign the case for trial.
The appealability of an order denying a summary judgment
originally presented a nice question under the Rules, and it has
been settled by the Court of Appeals. In Bell v. Harmon'7 it was
held that such an order is not only not appealable in itself, being
clearly interlocutory, but it is not even reviewable on an appeal
from the final judgment, provided that the denial of the motion
was based on the ground that an issue of a material fact was
presented. If the motion is denied on the ground that as a matter
of law the moving party is not entitled to judgment, then such
order, while not independently appealable, may be reviewed on
an appeal from the final judgment. 8
It is apparent that the summary judgment procedure is a
valuable method of disposing of cases where the real controversy
concerns a question of law. Rule 56 should be well understood
by all lawyers and should be utilized to the fullest extent. It may
be observed that this is one Rule that may be invoked unsuccess-
fully without injurious effect, and even if the motion is denied, it
may serve a salutary purpose in pointing up the true issues of the
controversy.
Appeals to the Court of Appeals
A lawyer may possibly slither through the preparation, plead-
ing, and trial of his lawsuit "by ear", with a lackadaisical com-
pliance with those Civil Rules which affect his case. If he loses
16 Watts v. Carrs Fork Coal Co., 275 S.W. 2d 431 (Ky. 1955).
17 284 S.W. 2d 812 (Ky. 1955).
18 Gumm v. Combs, 302 S.W. 2d 616 (Ky. 1957).
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he is confronted with the problem of appealing to the Court of
Appeals. If he has poorly practiced his case, he can afford to do
so no longer. The right of appeal is a special privilege granted
by the legislature, and the Court of Appeals in the Civil Rules
and in its own Rules has prescribed the precise conditions under
which a party may further be heard. It is fantastic to think that
any lawyer would undertake to appeal a case without making a
special effort to learn and comply with the rules which are so
vital to his cause. Yet this happens entirely too often and with
disastrous results. The Court of Appeals is not in the business of
bailing out clients from the adverse effects of the carelessness of
their counsel.
Appellate procedure must be exact in the interests of the
orderly administration of justice. It is not a hit or miss proposi-
tion. For the ordinary case there are only three Rules, with ap-
propriate subdivisions, governing the procedure, being Rules 73,
74 and 75. The Rules are simple, clear and direct. There is no
excuse for their non-observance.
The underlying condition of an appeal is that it can only be
from a final judgment. This has always been so. It has been
prescribed by statute" for a great many years. It has been
recognized in many decisions.2 °
Interlocutory orders are not appealable. For example, an order
granting a new trial is not appealable. This has been settled for
so long that it is difficult to understand why attorneys continue
their fruitless attempts to appeal from such orders. It simply
cannot be done.2'
It is true that alleged error in granting a new trial may
properly be reviewed on an appeal from the final judgment
entered in the action. 22 Obviously that judgment is under attack
on the ground that it should not have been entered because the
new trial from which it emerged should not have been granted in
the first place. We can say with assurance that an attempted
appeal from an order granting a new trial will probably be dis-
missed forthwith by the Court of Appeals.
19 Ky. Rev. Stat. sec. 21.060 (1958).
2 0 Payton v. Payton, 298 S.W. 2d 883 (Ky. 1956); Massey v. Fischer, 248
S.W. 2d 889 (Ky. 1951); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 803 Ky. 411, 197 S.W. 2d 923
(1946); Farmers Bank and Trust Co. v. Stanley, 190 Ky. 762, 228 S.W. 691
(1921).
21 Cornett v. Wilder, 307 S.W. 2d 752 (Ky. 1957).
22 Clay, op. cit. supra ixote 14, at 79.
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Another type of interlocutory order which is not appealable
is the one which determines a single claim in a multiple claims
suit. For example, if A sues B and C and the court grants sum-
mary judgment to C, this order, though final as between A and C,
is not a final judgment in the action. We have a Rule which spells
this out most clearly. The Rule is 54.02. It positively states in
substance that when more than one claim for relief is presented
in an action, any order or other form of decision, however desig-
nated, which adjudicates less than all the claims shall not term-
inate the action as to any claim and is subject to revision prior to
the entry of a judgment adjudicating all claims.
This same Rule prescribes a procedural device by which the
"hallmark of finality" may be impressed upon an interlocutory
order, thereby making it final and appealable. However, if you
will, the requirements are technical, and only by compliance
therewith may an interlocutory judgment be made appealable.23
The next possible pitfall of a lawyer is the requirement that a
sufficient jurisdictional amount be shown in his record to give the
appellate court jurisdiction. 4 Since we are concerned with a mat-
ter of jurisdiction, any attorney must recognize the necessity of
knowing and complying with the provisions of these three
statutes. If the amount in controversy is less than $200, exclusive
of interest and costs, no appeal to the Court of Appeals may be
taken. If the amount is between $200 and $2500, an appeal may
be taken only by compliance with the "technical" requirement of
the original KRS 21.080.25
The jurisdictional amount in controversy must be shown by
the judgment as construed with the pleadings. If the judgment
when so construed does not show the amount, and it is ascertain-
able, the appeal cannot be entertained and the lawyer cannot get
to first base. This is a jurisdictional matter of vital importance.
In the event neither the pleadings nor the judgment show the
amount in controversy, KRS 21.070 authorizes and directs the
trial court, upon request of either party, to state the actual value
2 3 Clay, "The Significance of Civil Rule 54.02, 21 Ky. S.B.J. 195 (1957).
24 This problem is governed by Ky. Rev. Stat. sees. 21.060-.080 (1958).
25 This statute was amended in 1958 to provide that the Court of Appeals
should promulgate rules governing procedure for appeals in these cases. Pending
adoption of the new rules authorized, which are now under consideration, that
court by order dated September 19, 1958 retained in effect the requirement of the




for purposes of appeal. Apparently this addition to the judgment
is not limited to the 10 day period within which a party may
move to amend a judgment under Rule 59.05. Consequently there
is no excuse for a party to come to the Court of Appeals without
his jurisdictional amount, if it is ascertainable.
In unusual circumstances where the thing in controversy can-
not be translated into a monetary valuation, the court may take
jurisdiction. 6
A dismissal of an appeal for failure to show the jurisdictional
amount is a sad thing indeed.
Perhaps little need be said concerning the necessity of Ming
the notice of appeal within thirty days (or a limited extension of
this period) from the date of the entry of the final judgment
appealed from, as prescribed in Rule 73.02. This is, in a sense, a
peculiarly arbitrary and technical rule. It is absolutely essential,
however, that we have an exact method of taking an appeal and a
fixed limitation of the time within which it may be taken. The
Rule is fair, and compliance therewith is simple. To overlook it
may be fatal. The requirements of this Rule are likewise juris-
dictional.27
We will now turn to a minor problem which again demon-
strates that failure to read and comply with a rule governing pro-
cedure on appeal may result in disastrous consequences. Rule
75.05 provides that the record on appeal shall be abbreviated so
as to include only those matters essential to the decision on the
questions presented. This Rule is designed to shorten the record
and save the litigants unnecessary costs in taking an appeal.
Shorter records are to be encouraged.
However, there is one condition imposed upon the appellant
when he designates less than the complete record. When this is
done Rule 75.04 has the simple requirement that the appellant
shall serve with his designation "a concise statement of the points
on which he intends to rely on the appea'. Nothing could be
plainer or easier to comply with. Unfortunately this Rule has
been, and continues to be violated.
The obvious result is that the appellant brings no issue to the
26McLean v. Thurman, 273 S.W. 2d 825 (Ky. 1954); Clay, op. cit. supra
note 14, at 89.2 7 Electric Plant Board v. Stephens, 273 S.W. 2d 817 (Ky. 1954).
28The complete record does not include non-essential orders, summons,
subpoenaes, notices, and similar papers.
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Court of Appeals to be heard, and that court is not engaged in the
business of discovering issues not properly presented. In Wallace
v. Walters & Keene Motor Company29 it was pointed out that
when only part of the record is brought up, the statement of points
is necessary to enable the opposing party to designate additional
parts of the record he deems necessary to meet the issues on the
appeal. The failure of the appellant to comply with the Rule
resulted in the dismissal of the appeal. Again we may remind our-
selves that each rule has a significant purpose and cannot be
ignored.
We finally reach the matter of filing the record on appeal in
the Court of Appeals within the time prescribed by Rule 73.08.
This Rule is also in a sense arbitrary and technical in requiring
that the matter be attended to within a fixed number of days.
There could be no misconstruction of the Rule. It can be violated
only by carelessness upon the part of the attorney.
It is true that sometimes the record cannot be prepared within
the original 60 day time limit allowed. The Rule itself makes
liberal provision for this contingency. It affords the appellant
opportunity to obtain all necessary extensions of time, either by
application to the circuit court or application to the Court of
Appeals. Sufficient time to file the record may always be obtained,
the only condition being that the application for extension is made
before the original or extended time limit runs out.
Many litigants have lost their opportunity to present the merits
of their appeal by failure to comply with this Rule. These cases
do not generally get into the books because the appeals are dis-
missed by order without opinion. Lawyers, always ingenious,
have fought vigorously to close the barn door after their horse
has already gone to the glue factory. They raise the question:
"What difference does it make if we are only a few days late?"
The answer is: If one appellant may violate this Rule, it would
be utterly unfair to require compliance by any other appellant,
and if this be so, there is no point in having any rule at all. Yet,
such a rule is necessary for the orderly administration of justice,
protecting the appellee from extended delay in realizing upon
his judgment and permitting the Court of Appeals to program the
hearing of cases.
29 280 S.W. 2d 493 (Ky. 1955).
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Another retrospective argument has been made that it is not
the duty of the lawyer but the duty of the clerk under Rule
75.07(4) to see that the record is timely ified in the Court of
Appeals. This argument was properly rejected in Belk-Simpson
Company v. Hill
0
It is a peculiar and unprofitable habit of the lawyer to neglect
to spend ten minutes to ascertain the proper procedure he should
follow at a particular phase of his proceeding and then spend
hours and even days of his time (and a substantial portion of the
court's time) in defending his neglect. As a general rule this does
not pay dividends.
What we have just said pretty well strikes the keynote of
this article. As we have earlier discussed, the civil procedural
rules are minimum in number and contain the fewest possible
requirements by which justice may be properly and efficiently
administered in the courts. The Rules are not a hodge-podge of
miscellaneous formal or harrassing requirements. Each rule em-
bodies many years of the finest legal thought and many years of
tested utility. Each one is essential to the proper working of the
pattern of which it is a part.
Again it may be repeated that the Rules are technical. The
lawyer, however, is supposed to be, and must be a trained tech-
nician. He must have a sound working knowledge of the tools of
his trade. Some of his best tools are the Rules of Civil Procedure.
As in any carpenter's shop, their proper use, not their abuse, is
called for.
S30288 S.W. 2d 869 (Ky. 1956); see Rules of the Court of Appeals, rule 1.070
(1957).
